This paper aims to model the auction prices of Italian contemporary art paintings. The contribution to the existing literature is twofold concerning both the methodological and the conceptual aspects. From the former point of view, we use the two-stages Heckit model which allows us to take into account the sample selection bias deriving from the "buying" risk, that affects transactions at auction. From the latter point of view, we have found that some sale characteristics such as auction house prestige and year of sale, are more important than the physical aspects of the paintings. Moreover, some artistic characteristics, the artist's name and their living status are also relevant.
Introduction
The prices of paintings depend upon a set of variables, concerning the characteristics of the paintings themselves, but also other aspects more difficult to be measured, such as the artist's popularity or the auction house's prestige. As a consequence, they may dramatically change over time increasing the uncertainty in the market. Nowadays, several questions about the level of art prices are still open: in particular, literature has not clearly defined what are the main drivers of their dynamics and what are the conditions for a more liquid and riskless investment in artworks.
From the theoretical point of view, there are two main theories regarding the price determination: on one hand, Baumol (1986) claims that there may exist no equilibrium level for art prices, so they can float more or less aimlessly with unpredictable oscillations emphasized by the activities of investors/speculators; on the other hand, Frey and Pommerehne (1991) assume that a "natural price" does not exist for paintings, neverthless market forces related to demand and supply determine prices for artworks, as for any other economic good.
From the empirical point of view, the pricing of paintings is generally discussed within the framework of market price indexes, with the aim of evaluating the rate of return of an investment upon such assets. In this context, the hedonic regression (from Anderson, 1974 onwards) seems to be a good methodology to select the variables which can be useful to model the evolution of artwork prices.
The key-objective of this paper is to carry out an empirical analysis about * We are very grateful, without implicating them for errors, to Caterina Lucarelli, Riccardo Lucchetti, Alberto Niccoli, GianMario Raggetti and Antonello E. Scorcu for their helpful comments and suggestions.
the price determinants of Italian contemporary art paintings at auction. The analysis is two-fold because it allows us to jointly model how some explanatory variables contribute to the probability of having an unsold item and to the price levels of sold works.
In doing so, a preliminary sample selection is obviously required. We consider a sample of 2817 painting transactions from the 21 Italian contemporary artists who showed the biggest turnover at auction during the period 1998-2002, according to Sacco, Santagata and Trimarchi (2005) . Starting from the available information about this sample of transactions, we made a new dataset in which all the variables are grouped into four categories, being the usual painting-specific attributes: they are the physical qualities of the work, the characteristics of the artist, the artistic and the sale characteristics of the paintings.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we discuss the theoretical aspects of pricing in the market of paintings, while in section 3 we introduce the problems related to the sample selection and the choice of the relevant variables. The whole empirical analysis is carried out in section 4 and section 5 concludes. Finally, the Appendix includes the complete list of all available variables.
Literature
The work of Frey and Pommerehne (1991) represents one of the first empirical studies regarding the determinants of art pricing; this article selects a list of endogenous and exogenous variables, in order to estimate the artistic quality of a painting and its impact upon prices. Other studies focussed upon these aspects followed, increasing the number of variables included in the price model and widening the perspective of the art price analysis within the context of market price indexes. In this area, the most important indexes are those based on:
• experts' judgement, such as the Sotheby's Art Index;
• the average painting methodology (Stein, 1977) , with its refinement of the representative painting (Candela and Scorcu, 1997 );
• repeat sales regression (Goetzmann, 1993; Pesando and Shum, 1999; Locatelli-Biey and Zanola, 1999; Mei and Moses, 2002 );
• hedonic regression (from Anderson, 1974 onwards) 1 ;
• hybrid approach (see Locatelli-Biey and Zanola, 2005) .
Among the methodologies developed to evaluate the rate of return of an artwork investment, the hedonic regression is able to identify the most relevant explanatory variables in determining the art prices. The essential approach is to gather price data on art sales through time (generally auction sales) and to regress the price of each work on some available characteristics of the painting such as, for example, the identity of the artist, the size of the painting, the medium or the support. The coefficients related to the different characteristics of the work could be interpreted as the "shadow-prices" of each attribute, thus the results of the hedonic regression permit the gauging of the influence of the separate factors upon the paintings' auction prices.
Regarding the perspective of price formation, the previous studies present the following key-issues: a) the variables related to the physical attributes are generally prevalent compared to other factors connected with the artistic relevance of the work and its promotion. Only for some authors the explanatory variables which capture the popularity and the artistic recognition of the artists and their work are relevant 2 . On the contrary, a well-run activity of artistic and commercial promotion is likely to strongly affect the market price of paintings, expecially in the area of contemporary art; b) only the sold works are considered, even if the problem of "unsold" or "bought-in" paintings is relevant and it could affect the future market valuation of the painting (see Anderson, 1974) . In each auction trading the seller fixes a reservation price that corresponds to the minumum price at which the item can be sold; when the highest bid does not reach the reserve price, the painting goes unsold or bought-in; c) sometimes these contributions deal with paintings belonging to different artistic movements. Even though the basic determinants of prices are common for several artistic currents, there is a lack of homogeneity because each segment of the market can have its own dynamics. Jeanfils (1995), Chanel, Gérard-Varet and Ginsburgh (1996) , Agnello and Pierce (1996) , Czujack (1997) , Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002) , Agnello (2002) , Hodgson and Vorkink (2004) , Higgs and Worthington (2005) , Figini and Onofri (2005) and Worthington and Higgs (2006) . 2 For example, only Czujack (1997), Wieand, Donaldson and Quintero (1998) and Figini and Onofri (2005) take into consideration the previous ownership of the painting and its presence in exhibitions; Wieand, Donaldson and Quintero (1998) and Figini and Onofri (2005) also consider the citations of the work in the artistic literature.
The sample selection
The analysis of the price dynamics of paintings sold at auction has to be based upon the choice of an appropriate sample. In this article, all the available information is taken from "Artindex Plus", a detailed database which contains the catalogue's information about several artworks 3 : more precisely, it provides the picture of the painting plus different pieces of information about the artist and the artwork itself (see section 3.1 for details).
Our sample choice substantially depends upon the reaching of a sort of homogeneity between variables: given that the market of paintings is composed of unique goods, we focus the attention upon Italian contemporary art because we need to deal with goods as comparable as possible 4 . Since Italian contemporary art itself is not completely homogeneous 5 , we limited our analysis to the 21 Italian contemporary artists who showed the biggest turnover at the most important international auctions during the period 1998-2002, according to Sacco, Santagata and Trimarchi (2005) 6 . The reason for this selection is that the paintings are considered as investment goods for which the main characteristics depend upon the market dynamics; the aestethic component is not supposed to be relevant here. The homogeneity in our sample is also preserved by the exclusion of prints and drawnings because these items have their own specific price dynamics, as claimed by Holub, Hutter and Tappeiner (1993) , and are often traded in separate ses-3 Artindex Plus is provided by Gabrius S.p.A. operating in Milan and belonging to the Munus Culture Holding (AMB network); nowadays it contains more than 700000 items (paintings, sculptures, drawnings, prints) produced from 1300 until today and auctioned from 1980 onwards. Artindex Plus information comes from more than 13000 catalogues. For more details see http://www.munusartinvest.com. 4 The market of paintings is usually divided in four branches which have their own dynamics and characteristics: Old Master, XIX Century, Modern Art and Contemporary Art. Taking care for the homogeneity, our choice of the latter segment is due to the easy ability of obtaining and updating sample data.
5 In practice, there are differences among "emerging" and "historical" contemporary art painters: first, each category has its own place to expose and sell the artworks and second, for emerging contemporary art painters catalogues have a promotional aim, while for the historical contemporary art painters catalogues guarantee authenticity. 6 Sacco, Santagata and Trimarchi (2005) define the "turnover" as the number of sold works multiplied by their mean price.
Moreover, they conventionally define as the Italian contemporary artists those Italian painters who carried out their activity after 60's. This selection criterium is not strictly applied, since some Italian painters, still working after 1960's, but historically placed with the best artists of Futurism or other artistic currents preceding the 1960's, are not included in their sample (for example, Carlo Carrà). So, in the analysis of Sacco, Santagata and Trimarchi (2005) , the Italian contemporary art conventionally starts with the contributions of Fontana (1899 Fontana ( -1968 , Burri (1915 Burri ( -1995 , Marini (1901 Marini ( -1980 and Manzoni (1933 Manzoni ( -1963 .
sions at auction.
Finally, we restrict the period of observation to the years which go from 1990 to 2006, since the Artindex Plus data regarding auction sales before 1990 are very poor and incomplete.
Following this sample selection, we work with a dataset of 2817 painting transactions placed at the most important auction houses between 1990 and 2006. The complete list about the authors and the auction houses are provided in Tables 9 and 12 in the Appendix. Table 1 reports the geographical distribution of painting transactions, in order to derive the size of the Italian Contemporary Art in the national and the foreign markets.
The Italian Contemporary Art market does not seem to be merely national: the percentage of paintings sold abroad over time is always greater than the percentage of artworks traded in Italy, even if the market share of Milan is close to the size of London market. Therefore, the competition ground for Italian Contemporary Art paintings seems to be global. A problem encountered in studying art prices stems from the fact that the auction data samples could suffer from some problems of selection bias, as already underlined by Wieand, Donaldson and Quintero (1998) . It is well known that the art market is divided into "primary", "secondary" and "auction" market: in the former the artist personally sells her works to buyers, while in the second the galleries and the art dealers trade paintings with private or istitutional collectors. Auction represents the remaining solution, therefore it can not take into account all types of paintings 7 . Neverthless, in this case public information exists and this overcomes most of the typical problems due to the incomplete and asymmetric information availability of the art market. Moreover, we suppose that auction prices affect the art market because collectors and professional art dealers take these price as guidelines, following the approach of Frey and Pommerehne (1989) . Finally, we also consider auction prices as adequate approximations of true equilibrium prices, as pointed out by Candela and Scorcu (1997) .
With this sample selection, we try to give an empirical contribution for a sector that literature has often neglected 8 . For example, several paintings made by young/unknown artists are generally managed by the artists themselves or by the galleries; paintings with "extreme" prices, generally bought by museums, exit the market and are not traded at auction anymore.
The data
8 Buelens and Ginsburg (1993) evaluated price indexes for English, German, Italian and French artworks without focussing their attention to a specific period, Agnello and Pierce (1996) use the auction prices of the main American authors to create a price index, while Mok, Ko, Woo and Kwok (1993) carry out the same analysis for Chinese authors. The contributions of Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002) and Hodgson and Vorkink (2004) consider the art market of Belgium and Canada respectively. Only the work of Candela and Scorcu (1997) uses data about the Italian market of Modern and Contemporary oil paintings; however, in this contribution foreign painters are also considered, because the dataset includes some transactions of Modern and Contemporary Art paintings auctioned in Italy, by "Casa d'aste Finarte" in Rome and Milan. e) sale characteristics of the painting (lot number, auction house, city, month and year of transaction), f) economic characteristics of the paintings (hammer prices, hammer prices plus transaction fees, pre-sale evaluation by experts who provide the estimation of a range of prices).
Tables in the Appendix report the descriptions of the variables used in our work.
The variables 3.2.1 Dependent variables
Given that we aim to model the auction price levels taking into account the problem of unsold paintings, our dependent variable is given by the auction price of each painting. In our dataset we have both the hammer price and the total purchase price: the latter differs from the former because it includes the auction house's transaction fees. All the prices related to unsold paintings at auction are not observable, hence they are set as zero.
Both types of prices are originally recorded in local currency, hence they are all converted to US Dollars to make them comparable, obtaining series p i and P i respectively 9 . Finally, we consider their logarithmic transformation, indicated with y i and Y i .
Descriptive statistics of p i , P i , y i and Y i are reported in Table 2 , while Figure 1 plots their frequency distribution. They refer only to sold works with a total purchase price greater than zero (missing values = 807).
Explanatory variables
The main evidence related to the variables identification concerns the qualitative nature of most of the available data; for this reason several variables are dummies (see the Appendix for details).
The explanatory variables for the price of Italian contemporary art paintings are organized into four categories; the list of potential price determinants and their codes are reported in the Appendix.
A. Characteristics of the artist: the explanatory variables belonging to this category are related to the personal characteristics of the artist who painted the work. Specifically, we include in this area the following information. 0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 
1) Name of the artist
According to Grampp (1989) , the reputation of the painter and the title of the painting are essential attributes, since they provide information about the painting itself, such as style and subject (see also Worthington and Higgs, 2006) . We use 21 different dummy variables, one for each artist in the sample, as shown in Table 9 .
2) Living status
This variable takes the form of a dummy with a value of one if the painter is deceased at the time of the sale and zero otherwise. All other things being equal, the price of artworks are often supposed to increase once an artist has died, as pointed out by Higgs and Worthington (2005) .
3) Year of birth
This variable is simply given by the artist's year of birth.
B. Physical characteristics: this type of variables take into consideration different aspects related to the execution of the artwork.
4) Medium
This variable allows us to control the assumption of a superior market value as a consequence of the media durability and particulars 10 . Table 10 contains the complete list of dummy variables belonging to this group; this also allows us to model all the cases in which different media are jointly used.
5) Support
In our database, we have 10 different types of support upon which the artwork is painted (see Table 10 ). The related dummy variables have the value of one when the specified support is used, alone or jointly with another, and zero otherwise.
6) Size
The size is given by the dimensions of the painting, used to calculate the surface (expressed in m 2 ) and the squared surface as in Czujack (1997) , Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002) , Higgs and Worthington (2005) and recently in Zanola (2007) . Following Czujack (1997) , who describes the price of painting as a concave function of dimensions, we expect a positive relationship between the price of the painting and its area and negative sign for the coefficient of the squared surface. This is coherent with two empirical pieces of evidence: first, large paintings are more expensive than smaller ones and second, too large paintings are difficult to sell to all but a museum.
C. Artistic characteristics: the variables of this category can be considered as proxies of the prestige and the popularity of the artwork in the art world.
7) Authentication by the artist
The presence of an authentication by the artist is useful to reduce the probability of buying a fake; the informative value of this indication is high, especially when many fake works of an artist are easily traded 11 . Similarly to previous qualitative characteristics of the painting, we use a dummy variable, with a value of one if the artist has certified the authenticity of the work and zero otherwise.
8) Publication in catalogues or monographies
The section "expertise" of Artindex Plus allows one to know whether the artwork has been published in catalogues/monographies. This is of some interest for the potential buyer, in order to establish the authenticity of the work 12 . A dummy is the natural counterpart of this qualitative information; it has the value of one if the painting is published in catalogues or monographies, and the value of zero if not.
9) Date
Sometimes, the catalogue does not report the execution date of the work. On the contrary, the creation date of the painting could be of interest to the buyer. Therefore we create a dummy variable, that has a value of one if the painting is dated and zero otherwise.
10) Recognition by experts
The section "expertise" of Artindex Plus also provides information about the presence of specific reports made by art experts that is one of the most official ways to certify the authenticity of an artwork. In order to evaluate whether a recognised painting gains a market premium or not, we introduce a dummy variable which take this into account.
11) Literature
As in Figini and Onofri (2005) , we try to model the relationship between the marketability of the painting and the citations in the artistic literature; for this purpose we introduce a dummy variable, equal to one if the painting is cited, and zero otherwise.
12) Signature
A buyer could derive some benefits from a signed work, in terms of prestige services or authenticity of the work 13 . The existence of the signature could have an influence upon the price; in order to control this relationship, we introduce a dummy variable with value one if the painting is signed and zero otherwise.
13) Title
Sometimes, the knowledge of the title could be considered a further piece of information by the buyer, enabling her to widen the set of available data. In order to analyse the title contribution upon the price determination of a painting, we introduce a dummy variable, equal to one if the work is titled and zero otherwise.
14) Exhibitions
In general, works that have been often exhibited are likely to reach a higher market value. Nevertheless, a painting belonging to a private collection, which has not been seen for a long time, could be attractive for collectors and reach a higher price. Since the final effect of exhibitions on price does not seem to be clear, we add this variable in our model. The available data do not allow us to distinguish between different types of exhibitions (such as permanent or temporary, solo or group exhibitions), thus the variable is given by the number of exhibitions the painting have taken part in.
15) Number of previous owners
According to auction houses, the price reached for a painting is influenced by its provenance. The dataset does not allow us to classify all previous owners according to their institutional nature (for example, museum, gallery or private collector), because it provides only the names of previous owners. The number of previous owners can be useful in order to test whether a painting rarely traded in the auction market reaches a greater price than a painting that has often been put on sale (see Fiz, 1995) .
D. Sale characteristics: with this set of explanatory variables we test the hypothesis that sale conditions have an effect upon the marketability and upon the final price reached by the painting at auction. Table 12 reports all the auction houses where the paintings belonging to our sample are traded. In the absence of transaction costs, the law of one price dictated that no significant price difference should exist for paintings of similar quality. However, Pesando (1993) , De la Barre, Docclo and Ginsburgh (1994) , Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002) , Hodgson and Vorkink (2004) , Higgs and Worthington (2005) , among others, show that Christie's and Sotheby's systematically obtain higher hammer prices; this evidence is generally attributed to the leading role played by both institutions in this business. We use a dummy variable for each auction house.
16) Auction house

17) Marketplace
Some auction houses have worldwide offices and, as a consequence, we account for 18 different marketplaces. Some geographical areas could be more active than others hence, we introduce a dummy variable for each city of sale, in order to estimate the influence of marketplace upon the determination of Italian contemporary art prices 14 .
18) Sale date
In our model, we consider only sale year and month; specifically, we introduce a dummy variable for each year (from 1990 to 2006) and a dummy variable for each month of sale. The aim is to catch possible seasonal effects in the price formation of paintings 15 .
19) Pre-sale estimates
Before an auction sale takes place, experts usually provide an estimate of the potential market value of the painting. Since this information is an indicator for the expected hammer price and for the seller's reservation price, its availability surely produces some effects upon the transaction. Since salesrooms provide pre-sale estimates as a range (M i , maximum potential price; m i , minimum potential price), in our model we choose the midpoint of this range (Czujack, 1997) , as reported in equation
When m i + M i = 0, it means that the pre-sale estimates are on request, therefore they are not public. Obviously, for the properties of logarithm, when m i + M i = 0 it follows that µ i is not available and the corresponding observations are dropped from the sample. If experts set m i and M i taking all the available information into account, equation (1) can be thought as a sufficient statistic for the auction price: as a consequence, µ i would be the only relevant explanatory variable. Otherwise, if it partially captures all the information, the impact of the other variables will affect the difference between auction prices and a function of pre-sales estimates. This problem will be discussed in section 4.3.
(2005) take into consideration the sale city in their hedonic regression for the price of paintings.
15 In their empirical study, Worthington and Higgs (2006) show that the most expensive sales of Australian Contemporary and Modern paintings take place on July and August, even if auction houses work continuously throughout the year. Agnello and Pierce (1996) , focussing on American Art Market, conclude that "January, the base month, results in the lowest auction prices, while December, May and August experience relatively higher prices....although July and August are low volume months".
The model
The aim of our proposed methodology is to model the auction prices of the Italian Contemporary Art paintings. Examining the determinants of auction prices from a speculative perspective, we have to consider the possibility of unobserved final prices; in other words, as well as the price reached by sold works, we have to take into account the "buying risk" affecting each transaction. Since in our sample various artworks go unsold, the analysis must be divided into two stages: in the first stage, a distinction between sold and unsold paintings is made, while in the second stage, prices of sold paintings are modelled.
The Heckit model
From the statistical point of view the possibility of unsold items at auction imply a problem of selection bias which can arise from censoring data. In particular, the properties of painting prices can vary taking unsold works into account, thus data can suffer from nonrandomness.
To address this problem the Heckit model (Heckman, 1979 ) is used; this model allows us to carry out the analysis when the dependent variable is continous but censored for values under a defined threshold. This methodology, which has been applied in different fields of research (labour economics, health economics or studies in R&D among others), was introduced to correct the selection bias occurred for nonrandomly selected samples and provides consistent estimates which eliminate the specification error for the case of censored data. Recently, Zanola (2007) used this methodology upon a sample of Picasso prints censored for repeat-sales, as well as Collins, Scorcu and Zanola (2007) upon a sample of Symbolist paintings.
Analitically, the Heckit model consists of
where N is the sample size. The first equation is the "selection equation", where s * i is a latent variable which is positive if the auction price is greater than the reservation price. Moreover, the 1 × K vector z i contains the individual characteristics that determine if the painting is sold or not, γ is a K-dimensional vector of unknown parameters and u i is a random disturbance. The latent variable s * i is not observed, therefore we define a dichotomic variable s i as
In practice, for sold paintings s i = 1, while it is zero otherwise. The second equation of the system (2) is the linear model of interest in which w i is the dependent variable; x i is the 1 × M vector of exogenous variables, β is a M -dimensional vector of unknown parameters and ε i is a random error term. The explanatory variables in x i could be also included in z i and viceversa. Moreover, we assume that the random disturbances are jointly distributed as
In our model the selection bias arises because the price w i is observed only when the i-th painting is sold (therefore s i = 1) and when σ uε is different from zero; in such a situation, Heckman (1979) shows that OLS estimation yields biased and inconsistent estimates of β.
Generally, the estimator for the Heckit model is the Maximum Likelihood (ML) under the assumption of joint normal distribution in equation (4); this method guarantees consistent and asymptotically normal and efficient estimates (see for example Greene, 1981) . Unfortunately, in our analysis ML estimation of (2) does not achieve convergence, hence we use the Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure which yields a less efficient estimator.
The whole procedure can be briefly outlined as follows: given that φ(·) and Φ(·) respectively are the density and the cumulative density functions of the standardised Gaussian distribution, the first step consists of the ML estimation of the following probit model
Equation (5) predicts whether an item goes sold/unsold and it is useful to obtain the inverse of the Mills Ratio
which will be used as an additional regressor during the second step to correct the potential sample selection bias. Once λ i is inserted in x i vector, its coefficient is β λ = σ uε σ 2 ε and the second equation in (2) can be estimated via the OLS method. The covariance between u i and ε i can also be estimated and the standard t-statistic on β λ is used to test if any problem of selection bias occurrs in our analysis.
Moreover, as shown by Pagan and Vella (1989) , the assumption of normality of the probit residuals u i is required to have consistency and plays a key role because it represents the sufficient condition to define λ i as in equation (6). Following Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) we carried out the following conditional moment (CM) test based on the OPG Regression 16 ι =γZ +bG + residuals,
where ι is a vector of ones, Z is the matrix whose each row is z i andγ,b are ML estimates from the probit Pr(s i = 1) = Φ(z i γ + G i b). To take into account for asymmetry and kurtosis, the i-th row of the matrix G is
whereû i are the model generalised residuals (see for example Pagan and Vella, 1989) . It can be shown that, for each observation, G i contains the sample counterparts of the orthogonality conditions about the conditional moments E(u k i |u i < −z i γ), when k is 3 and 4 respectively (see Skeels and Vella, 1999) .
The basic idea is that, if G i is not statistically relevant in the selection equation, the probit model (5) is correctly specified. Hence, the null hypothesis of the CM test is H 0 : b = 0 and the test statistic is given by N times the R 2 of the regression (7). Given that G has two columns, the asymptotic distribution is the standard χ 2 2 . In the next two sections a twofold approach will be tried: in section 4.2 a descriptive model for the auction prices is proposed, while in section 4.3 we discuss the problem of inserting the pre-sale estimates in the estimation of price in order to exploit more information.
Empirical results
After defining the partitioned vector
. . . µ i ] containing all the explanatory variables, the starting point of our analysis consists of the Heckit estimation using the vectorx i as regressor in the second step. In this context, the second equation in (2) can be thought as a sort of an hedonic regression in which the selection bias has been taken into account. All results for w i = y i , Y i are provided in Tables 3 and 4, while Table 5 contains some regression statistics; some explanatory variables among those presented in section 3.2.2 are dropped to avoid collinearity and, after some preliminary estimates, other variables are excluded to reach the possible maximum reduction of parameters, without any loss of relevant information. The first emerging aspect is that the estimates of the auction prices of the Italian Contemporary Art paintings are quite similar for the logarithms of the hammer price (y i ) and of the total purchase price (Y i ): the presence of transaction fees does not seem to have any relevant impact upon our analysis, also considering that there are 4 missing values for P i in our original sample (see the total observations in Table 5 ). The sample size reduction is due to three missing values in surf ace and squares.
The null hypothesis of the CM test is strongly accepted in both cases and this supports the consistency of our estimates in which λ i is not statistically different from the inverse of the Mills Ratio.
The t-statistic evaluated for λ i indicates that some correction for the sample selection bias is needed and, for this reason, the Heckit model is superior to OLS.
The negative estimated value of the coefficient related to λ i depends upon σ uε < 0: this suggests that paintings that go sold are more likely to be those with a lower price, since cheaper paintings are likely to be bought by a wider group of potential buyers.
Moreover, the Box and Pierce (1970) normality test highlights that the model disturbances are not jointly normally distributed and this is probably the reason why the ML estimation process does not converge.
The contributions given by the explanatory variables in the two steps of the estimation are discussed below.
First step
Only the dummies related to painters Boetti, Campigli, Fontana and Magnelli positively contribute to the outcome of artwork transactions. This suggests that the paintings made by this group of artists are, on average, less likely to go unsold at auction, showing a strong tendence to be easily traded. If the artist is dead at the moment of sale the painting has a higher probability to go unsold, as highlighted by the negative and significant coefficient related to dead. The variable birth has been dropped according to the results of preliminary analysis in which it was found to be not statistically relevant in both steps of estimation.
Media and support do not play any relevant role upon the probabiliy that paintings go unsold; only items painted with enamel are less likely to be sold. Even if in our sample most of the paintings are made on canvas and paper (see Table 10 ), they do not affect the estimation.
All the variables used to capture the prestige and the popularity of the paintings do not seem to be relevant at this stage of the estimation, with the only exception being literature which has a very feeble effect (the p-value is about 0.11).
The outcome of the sale, in terms of sold/unsold work, is highly determined by the auction house where the sale is arranged. For the need of parsimony, we consider only Christie's, Sotheby's and Finarte where more than 90% of transactions are placed. All their coefficients are positive and highly significant. The findings about Christie's and Sotheby's are coherent with those of De la Barre, Docclo and Ginsburgh (1994) who argued that some auction houses are able to systematically influence the successful outcome of the sale since they often attract more high valued artistic works 17 . The result of Finarte could be intepreted as a consequence of the "home bias effect", that is a general preference of buyers for domestic art production, as pointed out by Candela and Scorcu (2004) .
It has also been previously proved that the other auction houses, the city and month of sale do not seem to have an additional effect on the probability of going unsold. 
Second step
It is straightforward evident from Table 4 that almost all variables play a key role in determining auction prices and the impact given by the majority of painters seems to be decisive. The number of the exceptions is very small and the statistical significance attributed to Pomodoro is scarse probably because only two works belong to our sample (see Table 9 ).
The estimation highlights that Campigli and Fontana, who have a positive and significant impact upon the selection equation, also show an analogous effect upon the second step; on the contrary, the coefficient related to Boetti has the opposite sign of that in the selection equation. The paintings made by Burri, Cattelan, Manzoni and Marini also seem to reach market values higher, on average, than other artists, while the negative parameters related to different painters suggest that their works generally achieve lower prices.
The variable dead do not have any effect, while the variable birth is dropped because of its statistical irrelevance. From our model one can argue that the death of the artist before the moment of sale only increases the probability that paintings go unsold, but does not affect auction prices. This result is in contrast with both contributions of Agnello and Pierce (1996) and Worthington and Higgs (2006) : the former paper showed an increase by 154% of the auction prices of American art when the artist was still alive, while the latter work found that paintings made by deceased artists are associated with a price increase of 100.58%.
Our estimation suggests that painting media do not have a relevant effect upon the total purchase price of a painting; the only exceptions are oil and the residual variable other for which the coefficients produce an increasing effect upon artwork prices. It is difficult to compare these findings with previous analyses especially because these contributions are sometimes limited to historical periods when only few media were known (see for instance Figini and Onofri, 2005) or restricted to single medium samples (Candela and Scorcu, 1997) .
The contributions of the supports are heterogeneous because canvas seems to have a significant and positive influence upon painting prices, while paper has the opposite effect.
The coefficient signs of the variables regarding the size of paintings are those expected and coherent with the findings of Czujack (1997) : in particular, the artwork prices can be described as a concave function in which the surface and the squared surface have a positive and negative relationship respectively. This suggests that, if the size is augmented, the Italian Contemporary Art prices tend to increase at first, but then decrease when the painting becomes too large and difficult to hang.
Among the artistic characteristics of the paintings, the publication in catalogues, the number of exhibitions, the literature and the number of previous owners have a positive effect, while the variable expertise surprisingly shows negative contributions, contrary to our expectation. Variables authentic and signature do not have any effect upon the estimation, maybe because the prestige of some auction houses serves as a guarantee of authenticity.
The sale year substantially affects the final purchase price of Italian contemporary art paintings: each year from 1991 to 2004 shows statistically significant and negative coefficients, while years 2005 and 2006 do not seem to be relevant. From the economic perspective the series of these coefficients can be used to built the yearly price index I t , with all other characteristics being equal. This index shows the contribution to auction prices dynamics given by years of sale and its equation is I t = 100 · exp{β t }, where t = 1991, 1992, . . . , 2006. Just the hammer price index is plotted in Figure 2 since the curve related to the total purchase price (Y i ) is very similar. The base year is 1990 in which I t = 100. For both series this index substantially shows an increase from 1994, while only in 2006 it has a value greater than those of the base year. This is consistent with the evidence of the art market downturn experienced in the early ninetees (see, among others, Mei and Moses, 2002) and the upturn of the market in recent years.
Finally, even if Table 3 highlights that principal auction houses strongly determine the outcome of sale, their contribution to price levels is not relevant and, for this reason, they have been dropped from the second the step of the estimation.
Sufficiency of pre-sale estimates
In this section we try to enhance our analysis by inserting the pre-sale estimates by experts in the estimation. In section 4.2 we showed a model which suffers from the loss of information due to the exclusion of µ i provided by equation (1). Henceforth, we shall modify the Heckit specification including this variable in both the selection equation and the auction prices equation. As we said before, it can be a sufficient statistic (see section 3.2.2) for the price of paintings, therefore it can substantially change the information set available to buyers. Table 6 reports the Heckit estimation for y i , while Table 7 provides the For each dependent variable, the dotted lines show the index confidence intervals given by 100 · exp{β t ± 1.96 · s.e.(β t )} for the t-th year.
regression statistics 18 . The estimation using Y i as dependent variable is quite similar to that in Table 6 , therefore it is omitted for brevity. Neverthless, in Table 7 regression statistics for both y i and Y i are shown, because there are some small differences. However, all the results are available upon request from the authors. Both estimations for w i = y i , Y i are carried out dropping 43 observations from the sample which depend upon the 40 missing values from series µ i (see Table 12 ) plus the 3 unavailable data values in series surf ace and squares.
The pre-sale estimates have a relevant impact in both steps of estimation. On one hand, the strong and negative effect upon the probability to have sold/unsold items at auction can be explained from two points of view: from the statistical perspective, µ i seems to represent essential information while, from the economic perspective, paintings that sell easily are those with low potential market values. This is coherent with the strategy of auction houses that often keep pre-sale evaluations low to attract more buyers. On the other hand, the strongly positive coefficient in the second step reveals that this variable plays a decisive influence upon final painting prices; this suggests that the higher the pre-sale evaluation by experts, the higher the final auction prices are.
Some variables that appeared relevant in the previous analysis, seem to lose their explanatory power when the pre-sale estimates by experts are included. Nevertheless, these results are not immediately comparable with those of the previous estimation, especially because some problems regarding the economic interpretation of the estimation can arise from the use of x i intead ofx i ; these problems are connected to the possible sufficiency of µ i which has to be discussed and checked.
Supposing that the experts' information set I is larger than that of the buyers F, hence F ⊂ I. If the experts have rational expectations and a quadratic cost (loss) function L(·), E[L(w i − µ i |I)] is minimised and the best predictor is given by the conditional mean
The variable µ i is a sufficient statistic for auction prices if, using the law of iterated expectations, it follows that
However, our empirical analysis does not support this condition: to address this problem Table 8 shows some Wald tests for the parameters in the second step estimation. From the theoretical point of view these tests should be carried out for the system of simultaneous equations
Unfortunately, the unsold works reduce the number of observations to n < N , therefore the estimation of (11) is not possible and our Heckit specification represents a sort of approximation. The null hypotheses tested are:
• a = 0: auction prices do not depend upon pre-sale estimates. This is the condition under which the model in section 4.2 has been estimated;
• a = 1: auction prices strictly depend upon pre-sales estimates, µ i is an unbiased predictor and b is the impact ofx i upon the difference between auction prices and the pre-sale evaluation;
• b = 0: all the explanatory variables inx i do not contain any relevant information once pre-sale evaluation is considered in the model;
• a = 1 and b = 0: auction prices only depend upon pre-sale estimates, hencex i do not have any effect upon the difference (w i − µ i ). In this case, µ i is unbiased, efficient and also contains all the available information. All the hypotheses are strongly rejected and this supports the idea that, even if pre-sale estimates represent a relevant price determinant of the Italian Contemporary Art paintings at auction, they are not a sufficient statistic.
There are three possible reasons for E(w i |F, µ i ) = µ i : first, pre-sale estimates can suffer from some market inefficiency (non rational expectations) for which the hypothesis (9) is violated 19 . Second, the loss fuction of the experts could not be quadratic as hypothized by the rational expectations theory; moreover, some asymmetries could arise especially because experts tend to underestimate m i and M i to make paintings more attractive to buyers. Third, the log transformation of auction prices can induce some distortion especially because, according to the Jensen's Lemma, the expectations about logarithms are different from the logarithms of the expectations.
However, even if an important determinant for auction prices is inserted in the model, the problem of the coefficients interpretability of the other variables arises: in practice, if the estimated parameters of the other explanatory factors are statistically relevant, this result would be interpreted as an additional effect which is not captured by the pre-sale estimates. To the contrary, often it is difficult to distinguish if the irrelevance of certain parameters is due to the presence of µ i or not.
In theory, the information properties of this model can be useful in a predictive setup, but this possibility is prevented by the unavailabilty of certain variables as, for example, the year of sale or the painters not included in our sample.
Concluding remarks
This paper aims to model the prices of paintings given a set of explanatory variables regarding different characteristics. The whole analysis is carried out after creating a sample of 2817 transactions of paintings made by 21 Italian contemporary painters and sold at auction during the period 1990-2006. To take the problem of sample selection bias arising from the inclusion of unsold paintings into account, the Heckit model (Heckman, 1979 ) is used to obtain consistent estimates.
Our estimation highlights that some mechanism of selection bias occurrs hence this methodology is superior to OLS. The main finding is that auction prices for the Italian Contemporary Art market depend upon several variables such as auction house prestige, year of sale, artist's popularity and different artistic characteristics of paintings (publication in catalogues, number of exhibitions, citations in the artistic literature, number of previous owners). This finding is consistent with the main existing literature.
Contrary to previous studies (see for example, Czujack, 1997 or Worthington and Higgs, 2006) , we found that traditional media, supports and conventional proxies of artistic qualities are less able to explain the marketability of paintings, while they have a strong effect on price levels. Other variables playing a leading role upon the outcome of sale are those related to sale characteristics (for example, auction house prestige) and to the years in which the transactions take place; the years of sale also affect the auction price determination.
A price index that fits the cyclical nature of the Italian Contemporary Art market has been derived from the coefficients related to the years of sale: after an initial decline it tends to increase from 1994 and finally have a strong rise after 2003. This evidence reflects the downturn of the art market in the early ninetees and it is coherent with previous literature. Some suggested reasons for this cycle could be macroeconomic factors such as the dependence of the art market upon per capita income (Frey and Pommerehne, 1991) , financial courses such as the correlation between art market cycles and bullish/bearish financial markets (Chanel, 1995) or simply art fads such as collectors' changing attitudes towards contemporary art (Buelens and Ginsburg, 1993) .
Moreover, we also try to estimate a model by inserting the pre-sale estimates provided by experts (µ i ). We find that they are not a sufficient statistic for auction prices, but they are crucial in both steps of the Heckit estimation: they serve as a deterrent to buyers when they are high but, at the same time, they are the main driving factors for prices when paintings are sold. The use of this explanatory variable enhances the model efficiency, but, from the economic perspective, also generates a problem of coefficient interpretability: when the estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables are significant their impact can be seen as a sort of a net effect. Otherwise, when the coefficients are not statistically relevant, it is hard to evaluate if this result depends upon the presence of µ i or not. 
